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Efficient Cause as Paradigm? From Suárez to Clauberg 
This paper critiques a narrative concerning causality in later scholasticism, due to, among others, 
Des Chene (1996), Carraud (2002), Schmaltz (2008), Schmid (2010), and Pasnau (2011). On this 
account, internal developments in the scholastic tradition, culminating in Suárez, lead to the 
efficient cause being regarded as the paradigmatic kind of cause, anticipating a view explicitly 
held by the Cartesians. Focusing on Suárez and his scholastic reception, I  defend the following 
claims: a) Suárez’s definition of cause does not privilege efficient causation; b) Suárez’s readers, 
from Timpler to Arriaga, did not interpret him as privileging efficient causation; c) it is only 
much later, in Clauberg, that we find a narrowing of the meaning of causation to efficient causal 
action; but d) this shift is better explained by Clauberg’s rejection of substance hylomorphism in 




The early modern period witnessed a narrowing of the meaning of cause. Whereas the scholastic 
tradition had worked with a broad notion of cause as an explainer, inherited from Aristotle’s 
multifaceted concept ‘aitia/aition,’ the mechanical philosophy sought to restrict it to that which 
explains in virtue of acting. Seventeenth-century theories of cause are seen as having resulted 
from the dismissal of Aristotelian formal and final—and to a lesser extent, material—causes as 
proper objects of inquiry, with the consequence that efficient causation—God creating the world, 
a builder building a house, one ball striking and setting into motion another—comes to mean 
causation as such.   
 While this shift has long been associated with mechanists such as Descartes, in recent 
times scholars have drawn attention to the mediating role of later scholastics, especially 
Francisco Suárez.1 As they see it, Suárez and his fellow Jesuits had already prepared the ground 
for the dismantling of the Aristotelian causal framework by treating, tacitly or explicitly, the 
                                               
1 Descartes’s own position on causation has been the subject of intense debate. For the purposes 
of this paper, I set aside issues of Descartes-interpretation to focus on seventeenth-century 




efficient cause as the paradigm of what it is for something to be a cause. It has been argued, in 
particular, that Suárez models his notorious definition of cause, as “a principle per se flowing 
being into another,” on the notion of efficient cause. That is, for Suárez, the meaning of 
causation as such tracks efficient causal action better than it does the attraction of ends or the 
union of form and matter. Consequently, in Suárez’s hands, the other species of cause have 
diminished or restricted application. The upshot, on this narrative, is that some of the novelty of 
the mechanistic approach to causation is anticipated in Jesuit scholasticism. As Robert Pasnau 
(2020, 95) writes, in the later medieval period,  
there was already a tendency to think of efficient causation as the paradigm case for what 
it is to be a cause […] This is an important part of the story of why later medieval 
metaphysics became increasingly vulnerable to the reductive approach of early modern 
mechanism.2 
 The object of this paper is to assess this account with respect to the role in it of Suárez 
and his followers. It begins in the next section by laying out Suárez’s doctrine of cause, and 
arguing that it does not privilege efficient causation. Suárez’s notion of causality as influx 
expresses the idea of ontological dependence in a broad sense, of which dependence due to the 
action of an agent is one species. Section Three then surveys the recent literature that has 
attributed to Suárez the thesis of the priority of efficient causation. Building on the criticisms of 
Kara Richardson (2015) and Sydney Penner (2015), it concludes that the textual evidence in 
support of the priority thesis is ambivalent at best. Section Four gathers further evidence against 
                                               
2 Similar positions are present in Des Chene (1996), Olivo (1997), Carraud (2002), Schmaltz 
(2008; 2014), Schmid (2010, 2015), Pasnau (2011), Åkerlund (2011), and Hattab (2012). The 
priority of the efficient cause thesis is prefigured in the important work of Anneliese Maier 
(1955), and the recent literature may well be seen as extending her reading of fourteenth-century 




the priority thesis by turning to Suárez’s reception among seventeenth-century academics who, 
we may reasonably suppose, were his primary audience. By examining the questions on cause in 
representative texts, including those of Eustache de Saint-Paul, Abra de Raconis, Rodrigo de 
Arriaga, Clemens Timpler, Jakob Martini, and Christoph Scheibler, it concludes that the priority 
of the efficient cause is not affirmed by prominent scholastics, all of whom are defending or 
modifying Suárez’s theory of cause. These authors interpret Suárez’s notion of causality as 
influx as wide enough to cover all four Aristotelian causal categories, and consistently reject the 
view that the efficient cause alone counts as a true cause.  
 Nevertheless, by the end of the century a clear narrowing of cause to mean efficient cause 
occurs. Section Five highlights the role in this process of certain post-Cartesian academics who 
attempted to reconcile the old and new metaphysics. Focusing on Johann Clauberg, it shows how 
his adjustments to the Aristotelian causal framework to fit a Cartesian theory of substance leads 
to the fragmentation of the former. To summarize: efficient causation does acquire prominence 
by the mid-to-late seventeenth century. But, in the scholastic tradition, this shift only occurs with 
the rejection of substance hylomorphism, not on account of perceived problems internal to the 
Aristotelian causal model.3  
                                               
3 Caveat: the labels ‘scholastic’ and ‘Aristotelian’ are problematic, to put it mildly. Here, by 
‘scholastic’ I mean university and gymnasium professors, specifically those—still the majority in 
early seventeenth-century Europe—whose teaching and writing was guided by Aristotle and the 
Aristotelian commentary tradition. My focus is the Aristotelian revival, led by the Jesuits, that 
was partly a response to new currents, including Ramist logic, Neo-Platonic metaphysics, and a 
host of alternatives in natural philosophy (e.g. hermeticism, alchemy, Stoicism, and the so-called 
‘Mosaic’ physics). The Aristotelian camp is far from homogeneous, and displays significant 
departures from medieval authorities such as Aquinas and Scotus. Yet, it is also unified in crucial 
methodological and substantive respects, and values the Aristotelian curriculum for its 
systematic character. This is appreciated not only by the Jesuits, bound by their order to follow 
Aristotle in philosophy, but also by Protestant academics post-1600. See Menn (1998), and Blair 
(2000) for a survey of anti-Aristotelian trends in this period. See Hill (2012) for an assessment of 





2. Suárez’s Doctrine of Cause 
Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations (1597) include an extraordinarily lengthy discussion of 
causation.4 Much of it deals with the four Aristotelian causes—material (DM 13-14), formal (15-
16), efficient (17-19), final (23-24), and their comparison (27)—as well as divine causation (20-
22), exemplar causation (25), and whether causes are more noble than their effects (26). 
Introducing these topics is a disputation on cause in general, or what makes it the case that 
something counts as a cause of any sort whatsoever (12). Suárez first establishes that cause is a 
common (though not properly transcendental) attribute of being, so that “there is no being that 
does not participate in some character of cause” (12.1.1), and that cause is a species of principle 
(12.1.25).5 In the next section (12.2), he elaborates his influential doctrine of cause.6  
                                               
philosophy. For the Jesuit influence in the revival of Aristotelian metaphysics in Protestant 
academies, see Petersen (1921, 259-338); Eschweiler (1928); Lewalter (1935); Leinsle (1985, 
206-70); and Courtine (1990, 405-35). See Grant (1987) for insightful discussion of the use of 
the label ‘Aristotelian’ in this period.  
4 I cite Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations as [DM], by disputation, section, and paragraph, 
from the Vives edition (1866). I have consulted Freddoso’s (1994, 2002) translations of DM 17-
19, and DM 20-22, Kronen and Reedy’s (2000) translation of DM 15, and Penner’s unpublished 
translations of DM 12 and DM 23 (available at http://sydneypenner.ca/SuarTr.shtml). Final 
responsibility for translations rests with me.  
5 Aertsen (2012, 608-11) shows that Suárez rejects the Scotistic innovation in the doctrine of 
transcendentals that treats disjunctive predicates as convertible with being in the same way as 
one, true, and good. Aertsen explains that, for Suárez, Scotus’s disjunctive transcendentals are 
not properly passiones of being but divisiones. That is, causa/causatum contract being 
completely into two divisions, but are not predicated in common of each division, and thus 
should not properly count as ‘transcendentals.’  
6 Suárez’s treatment of the general notion of cause is part of an ongoing sixteenth-century 
discussion of articulating what the different genera of causes have in common, or what makes a 
cause be a cause as such. Capriati (2020) situates Suárez’s account in the background of his 
Jesuit superiors and peers, Benito Pereira, Pedro da Fonseca, and Francisco Toledo. Freddoso’s 
(2002) excellent introduction to his translation of Disputations 20-22 places Suárez’s treatment 




 Suárez begins by identifying three elements in what we may call a causal situation: the 
“thing that causes” (res quae causat), “causation itself” (causatio ipsa; also, causalitas), and “the 
relation that either follows or is thought” (relatio quae vel consequitur vel cogitat). By ‘cause’ he 
means a being that is the source of reality in the effect. By ‘causation’ or ‘causality’ is meant that 
feature in virtue of which a cause actually grounds its effect, or through which “a cause is 
formally constituted in act” (DM 12.2.1). Resulting from actualized causation is a causal 
relation, a fuller discussion of which Suárez postpones until Disputation 47, “On Real 
Relations.”  
 Suárez expresses the relationship between these elements in two definitions. The first is 
borrowed from his fellow Jesuits, Pedro da Fonseca and the Coimbra Commentators: “a cause is 
that on which something else per se depends” (causa est id a quo aliquid per se pendet). The 
second is Suárez’s own formulation: “a cause is a principle per se flowing being into something 
else” (causa est Principium per se influens esse in aliud) (DM 12.2.4).7 Suárez declares the first 
to be correct, and offers the second as his preferred gloss, for reasons that are largely formal. 
First, he notes that his version makes explicit that cause is a species of principle, one that is a 
source of being (as opposed to a principle of knowledge, or a logical, or temporal principle). In 
the case of fire heating water, for instance, the cause is the fire itself, rather than, say, the causal 
event or the motion preceding the effect. Second, Suárez prefers his formulation for clarifying 
the specific difference that is combined with the genus in the definition. The first formulation 
                                               
7 The verb ‘influere’ and its participles ‘influens’ and ‘influxus’ are notoriously difficult to 
translate in this context. The most literal meaning of ‘influere’ is ‘to flow into,’ as a river flows 
into (influit) the sea. The verb has been variously translated as ‘to influence,’ ‘to infuse,’ ‘to 
impart,’ and ‘to inflow.’ Suárez’s usage is non-standard, in that he sometimes uses the verb 
transitively, as in ‘influit esse.’ I am inclined to preserve the non-standard, technical character of 
Suárez’s Latin and, for that reason, follow Penner in translating transitive uses with the awkward 




expresses the idea that an effect per se depends on a cause insofar as the being of the former is 
grounded in the latter. The qualifier ‘per se’ is meant to exclude non-beings such as privations, 
per accidens features, and sine qua non conditions from counting as causes. While these figure 
as necessary conditions in causal situations—heat must be absent in water prior to its becoming 
hot; the color of fire is always present in the heating event; and fire and water must be in 
sufficient proximity—they are not sources of the heat that comes about in water.8 Suárez thinks 
his version, by characterizing dependence as influx of being, better highlights the special 
grounding work of the causal principle. A cause grounds a new reality in another thing; it does so 
in virtue of possessing through its essence a formally similar reality; and the reality in the cause 
is the source of the new reality in the effect. Esse ‘flows’ from the cause into the effect.  
The term ‘influens’ scarcely illuminates, though, just what it is in virtue of which 
something is a cause. For the moment, we can turn to Suárez’s closely related notion of 
‘causality.’ Causality designates that feature of a cause in virtue of which it grounds its effect: 
“that by which a cause in act is formally and proximately constituted in the being of cause.” It is 
also glossed as, “nothing other than that influx or concourse [influxus ille, seu concursus] by 
which each cause in its genus flows being into the effect” (DM 12.2.13). Suárez distinguishes 
causality from the relation of cause and effect. Causality is prior to the relation and gives rise to 
it. The relation between cause, causality, and the effect can be expressed as follows: the cause is 
the subject, its causality or influx the foundation in its nature, and the effect of actualized 
causality is the term of a causal relation. Causality or influx is then “some medium between the 
entity and the relation of the cause,” or what makes it the case that a certain agent is 
                                               
8 Sangiacomo (2020, 218-23) shows that Suárez excludes sine qua non conditions from counting 




appropriately constituted to bring about a formally similar reality in a patient under the right 
conditions (12.2.13).  
Suárez is quite aware of the wooliness of this account of causality. Causality and influx 
seem to be equally opaque terms for whatever it is that distinguishes the grounding role of the 
agent/subject from the roles of mere necessary conditions in a causal situation. He continues:  
what that [medium, i.e. causality or influx] is, and whether it is something in the cause 
itself or in the effect, and whether it is some mode distinct from them or merely a 
denomination taken from both, cannot be explained more clearly here, until we have 
come around to explaining the individual genera of causes.”9 (12.2.13) 
What it is that makes something a cause, Suárez tells us, cannot be understood except by 
reference to a particular genus—material, formal, efficient, final (and exemplar, which for 
Suárez is a kind of efficient cause). ‘Causality’ and ‘influx,’ in other words, are placeholders for 
the different sorts of real grounds in the nature of an agent in virtue of which it is apt to produce 
determinate effects. Suárez’s reasons for preferring his formulation of the definition in terms of 
‘principle’ and ‘influx’ over the Coimbran one in terms of ‘that’ and ‘per se depends’ are formal, 
that it better indicates the genus and difference combined in the definition.  
In fact, Suárez makes it clear that the awkward locution, ‘influens esse,’ is meant to gloss 
the notion of causal dependence. One crucial motive behind his terminology lies in his concern 
that the definition should clearly exclude the relations among the Persons of the Trinity. The 
Father is the principle of the Son, and both together are the principle of the Holy Spirit, but in 
                                               
9 “Est igitur ille influxus aliquid medium inter entitatem, et relationem causae: quid autem illud 
sit et an sit aliquid in ipsa causa vel in effectu, et an sit aliquis modus distinctus ab illis, vel 
tantum denominatio ex utroque desumpta, non potest hic distinctius explicari, donec ad singula 




neither case is the principle the cause of the principiatum, for the three are one in essence. Suárez 
thinks his formulation better satisfies this demand by making explicit the condition that causal 
dependence should require distinctness of essence between cause and effect, or that the latter 
should not have its dependent reality from itself, “but to have it given and communicated by 
another” (datum et communicatum ab alio) (DM 12.2.6). He reckons that this feature of causal 
dependence is more precisely expressed with ‘influere’ than with ‘pendere.’ Yet, he emphasizes 
that the two phrases are equivalent: “I said that a cause is that which flows being into another. 
For these words declare the same thing that is implied in the word ‘depending’” (12.2.7). Causal 
dependence is ontological dependence of one thing on another, essentially distinct, thing.  
Causal dependence in virtue of the communication of being does not, however, amount to 
a transfer of property instances from cause to effect. For ‘influens esse’ not only signifies 
distinctness in the essences of agent and patient but also distinctness in what the cause 
communicates to the effect from “the proper being that the cause has in itself.” The picture is 
admittedly mysterious. Something in the nature of a cause makes it apt to produce ontologically 
distinct but formally resembling states in another thing, but without giving away a part of its own 
being. Suárez’s summation does not shed further light: for an effect “to depend in its being on 
another” is for it “to have being that is distinct from [the cause], and to participate in [the cause] 
or in some way flow from its [i.e. the cause’s] being” (DM 12.2.7).10  
At any rate, what is relevant for present purposes is that the equivalence of the two 
definitions speaks against interpreting Suárezian influx-causality as a literal transfer of properties 
from one substance to another, a view that has often been ascribed to ‘the Scholastics,’ and to 
                                               
10 “Unde hoc est proprie pendere in suo esse ab alio, habere scilicet esse distinctum ab illo, et 




Suárez as their leading representative, since the later seventeenth century. Louis de la Forge 
(1997, 145), in arguing for occasionalism, ascribes such a view to unnamed scholastics. He 
contends that, if force is conceived as real qualities are “in the Schools,” then motion would 
absurdly entail that an instance of force “subdivides itself when one body moves another and that 
it gives part of its movement to the other body.” Leibniz (1969, 269; 494) similarly finds it 
impossible “how anything can pass over from one thing into the substance of another,” an 
implication he finds in the “system of physical influx” he attributes to “the Scholastics.”11  
Whoever La Forge or Leibniz may have had in mind, these cannot be fair criticisms of 
Suárez. They rest, first, on a narrow focus on the formulation of causality as influx, and second, 
on an interpretation of influx as physical transmission of qualities. But Suárez, as we have seen, 
works with two coextensive definitions of cause, each of which highlights different features of 
causation. The first, in terms of ‘per se pendere,’ sufficiently expresses the condition that not 
every relation of following (consequi) is causal, by excluding privations and sine qua non 
conditions from the concept of cause. Cause is not a principle simply in the sense of having 
temporal or logical priority, but rather in virtue of having ontological priority. To emphasize this 
positive feature, Suárez prefers the language of ‘influere,’ which he thinks, perhaps 
optimistically, better conveys the thought that a cause is the real ground of a quality produced in 
                                               
11 Leibniz characterizes physical influx as the view that created substances exert “mutual 
influence” on one another, or that one acts upon another in such a way that it results in the 
transfer of a quality. In his Reply to Bayle, he hints that this system “when taken in the popular 
sense is that of the Scholastics” (1969, 494). O’Neill (1993) highlights the lack of clarity in 
Leibniz’s ascription of the label ‘physical influx,’ and concludes that we may hold him 
responsible for inventing the system that he then criticizes. That Suárez is among Leibniz’s 
targets has been reasonably assumed in recent scholarship; e.g. Rozemond (2009), McDonough 
(2017). Tuttle (2017) also notes the Cartesian/Leibnizian misinterpretation of Suárez. It is also 
worth noting that the ‘influx’ terminology is not Suárez’s innovation. It occurs in relation to 
cause as far back as Aquinas, and is also used by some of Suárez’s immediate predecessors. See 




an effect. Furthermore, given Suárez’s comments on his definition, the view that influx amounts 
to the transmission of properties between substances is an overinterpretation. Suárez, at least, 
does not propound Leibniz’s system of physical influx.  
An interpretation of influx as transmission also creates the impression that Suárez has in 
mind above all the efficient cause, for that is what most directly brings about a new quality in a 
patient. Yet, Suárez explicitly rejects that implication, and insists that his definition ranges over 
the distinct causalities of form, matter, and end: “this mode of dependency [i.e. of influx] […] 
can be found in all the causes that we experience; it can quickly be shown for every genus of 
cause” (DM 12.2.7). Suárez, at least, thinks his notion of cause is capacious enough to include 
several sorts of causal grounds that do not reduce to efficient causation.  
One could perhaps criticize Suárez’s definition of cause as being empty, or uninformative 
about any concrete domain of causal experience, as Leibniz (1969, 126) complained in his 
Preface to Nizolius’s Antibarbarus, or unsatisfactory as a unified definition of the four 
Aristotelian causes, as Fink (2015, 42) charges.12 But it is not the case that it privileges efficient 
causation, or that it treats causation as property transfer. In the next section I argue that the 
                                               
12 To the objection that the project of defining cause is idle because uninformative, I think Suárez 
would respond that it is not meant to be ampliative but only explicative. That is, he does not 
think that by defining cause in its genus we would learn something new about how burning, or 
cutting, or, flying, or growing happens. Rather, what the definition aims to draw out is the 
common semantic core implicit in empirical causal predications. For Suárez, everyday causal 
concepts express much more than regularities or generalized dispositions to burn, cut, fly, or 
grow. For him, such concepts are inferentially bound up with more general concepts, of which 
‘cause’ simpliciter is one. The motivation behind the Jesuit project of defining cause is echoed, I 
think, in Elizabeth Anscombe’s response to the Humean rejection of the general concept of cause 
for the reason that we never observe causality as such. As she puts it, “the word ‘cause’ can be 
added to a language in which are already represented many causal concepts” (1993, 93). The 
project of explicating ‘cause’ is not to find a new concept to describe some particular domain of 




textual evidence for the comparative priority of efficient causation in Suárez is far from 
conclusive.  
 
3. Efficient Cause as Paradigm?  
According to a prevalent view in recent scholarship, by the late sixteenth century internal 
developments in the scholastic tradition had led to the efficient cause being considered the 
paradigm of what it is for something to be a cause. On this story, by Suárez’s time, efficient 
causal action comes to express the core meaning of causation. Tad Schmaltz (2008, 11), for 
instance, writes that Suárez “anticipates Descartes’s views in taking efficient causality to provide 
the paradigmatic instance of causation.” And Stephan Schmid (2015, 419-20) declares that “there 
is no doubt that Suárez’s influxus-theory of causation privileges efficient causes in rendering 
them the paradigm kind of cause: the kind of cause after which all other kinds of causes are 
modelled.” 
This narrative has emerged partly through interest in the fate of the other Aristotelian 
causes. The problem of final causes has received especial attention. Briefly, the story goes, the 
traditional priority of final causes, that ‘every agent acts for an end,’ was gradually undermined 
as pessimism grew about how aimed-at ends, which do not yet exist, could be proper causes. On 
Anneliese Maier’s classic account (1955, 273-335), one solution, originating with Avicenna, 
restricted final causation to fully cognitive agents, thus to humans, angels, and God. She argues 
that Avicenna’s cognitivist model had become dominant by the fourteenth century, culminating 
in Jean Buridan, for whom all of non-rational nature could simply be treated as a divinely 
ordered system of efficient causes. In recent decades, Maier’s account has been extended to the 




distinguishing ends and final causes, and confining the latter to moral action. On his reading, 
although the Jesuits affirm the universality of ends in nature, they not only acknowledge 
difficulties in how ends cause but also conclude that natural agents are end-directed only as 
instruments of divine efficient causality.  
But while Des Chene hesitates to attribute to Suárez a full-blown reduction of final 
causes to efficient, that is what Gilles Olivo (1997, 102) and Vincent Carraud (2002, 161) 
conclude is entailed by Suárez’s account. Others have drawn similar lessons. Schmid (2015) 
resists Carraud’s reductive interpretation, but does not find in Suárez any place for final causes in 
non-human nature, attributing to him a kind of “finality without final causes.” Åkerlund (2011) 
defends a still more radical thesis, that not only are Suárezian ends not causes, they are not even 
real beings. For, if ends figure in action only as objects of the will, they need not have reality as 
termini of categorical causal relations. It suffices that ends be mere beings of reason. Surveying 
the scholastic tradition from Aquinas to Suárez, Pasnau (2020, 90) finds “little enthusiasm for 
Aristotle’s naturalized approach to teleology as goal-directed, non-cognitive impulse, and grave 
doubts over whether final causes are a legitimate kind of cause at all.”  
To a lesser extent, claims of the priority of efficient causation have arisen from 
considerations having to do with formal causation. Pasnau (2011, 557-65) has argued that later 
Aristotelians such as Suárez tend to emphasize a ‘physical’ rather than ‘metaphysical’ role for 
form. That is, they regard forms more as internal efficient causes than as abstract entities that 
individuate substances and supply conditions of their synchronic and diachronic unity. As 
physical principles, substantial forms explain how a material substance is internally regulated; 
why, for instance, water naturally turns cold after heat is removed, or a stone moves to a lower 




physical conceptions of form. The former is meant to explain the deep structure of the world, but 
has little to do with causal explanations in the modern sense. The latter, meanwhile, ascribes to 
form a causal role insofar as it is supposed to explain the behavior of a material substance. He 
concludes that the shift in emphasis has “profound consequences for the subsequent history of 
philosophy,” inasmuch as treating form “as a kind of internal efficient cause is to diminish the 
distinctness and autonomy of formal explanations” (2011, 564). Helen Hattab (2012, 116) 
similarly contends that, “in Suárez’s hands the substantial form was transformed into something 
more like an internal efficient cause than a formal cause.” 
 Evidence of the relative priority of efficient causation is not hard to find in Suárez. He 
seems to restrict final causation to rational agency: “the causality of the end […] is better known 
to us in created intellectual agents and it has more of a certain quality and special mode in them” 
(DM 23.1.8). He also wonders how ends could be real causes, if final causation is understood as 
the “metaphorical motion” of the will toward a represented object —the standard Aristotelian 
locution for describing the causality of ends: “if an end has the character of a cause only under 
this account, then, at least with respect to natural agents, the end cannot be a real cause, because 
it cannot move or entice [such agents]” (23.1.4). Further, Suárez’s comparisons of the four 
causes suggest the priority of efficient causation. He writes: “because the influence of the final 
cause is very obscure, especially with respect to real and physical change, one may briefly say 
that even though the final cause might be prior in the order of intention, the efficient cause is 
nonetheless first in execution,” and that “the efficient cause alone really has an influence—that 
is, effects motion—per se and extrinsically” (17.1.3). The two intrinsic causes appear similarly 
diminished. Form and matter are said to be “less perfect according to their own genera, in being 




being as compose it through themselves,” and therefore the title of cause “is said in the first place 
of efficient causes” (27.1.10). Finally, in a much-quoted passage, he suggests that the efficient 
cause best accords with the general definition: “the whole definition of cause is most properly 
suited to the efficient cause” (ergo tota definitio causae propriissime convenit efficienti) (12.3.3). 
The impression conveyed by such passages, however, is far from decisive. There is 
plenty of textual evidence pointing in the other direction, that Suárez does not grant priority to 
efficient causation either ontologically or conceptually. He would deny that form, matter, and 
end cannot exist without efficient causes but efficient causes can exist without them. He would 
equally deny that the other causes cannot be conceived without the efficient, but efficient causes 
can in the absence of the others.  
 We can begin with the last of the above-quoted passages, which appears most directly to 
assert priority. As Sydney Penner (2015, 134-5) argues, the context of this passage undermines 
the priority claim. At DM 12.3.3, Suárez is giving a summary defense of the four-cause model, 
that matter, form, efficient, and final are coequal causes of being. Indeed, in the same paragraph, 
Suárez also affirms that matter has “proper influx,” forms are “proper causes,” and that “the 
definition of cause is also truly and properly suited to the end.” At best, the import of 
‘propriissime’ amounts to priority in the order of inquiry, that we begin investigating nature by 
observing an agent’s patterns of interaction with its environment. As we shall see in the next 
section, some of Suárez’s followers make this weak sense of priority explicit while denying 
stronger ones.  
 Attention to context also softens the force of the comparative claim at DM 17.1.3, that the 
efficient cause alone has real influence and final causality is obscure. Here Suárez is addressing 




change first exists” (17.1.2). The objection is that the definition does not sufficiently distinguish 
efficient and final causes, since both are per se extrinsic principles, and the end is traditionally 
understood as “first in the order of intention,” and thus prior to the efficient cause. Suárez’s 
emphasis in this passage, accordingly, is on the distinction between the directionality of the two 
causes: the efficient cause is a principle “whence” or “from which” (unde, vel a quo) change 
occurs, the end a principle “for the sake of which” (propter quam) it occurs. His concern is to 
defend the distinctiveness of efficient causation, not to question final causation. As for the 
unintelligibility of the latter, Suárez does not think that understanding efficient causality is 
without its own difficulties. In the same section, he also concedes that, “an action’s proper nature 
and its distinctness from the agent and from the effect are rather obscure” (17.1.5).  
Another reason offered for the priority thesis is that Suárez’s characterization of final 
causation as the metaphorical motion of the will entails its dependence on efficient. Schmaltz 
(2008, 34) argues that, if final causation requires the actualization of a will or similar power to 
pursue a represented end, then it would seem to depend on efficient causation. He stresses the 
contrast between the genuine, efficient causal action of the will from its ‘merely’ metaphorical 
motion, or its attraction toward a represented end. Suárez certainly marks the distinction: 
“insofar as [the action of the will] is caused by the will it is effective causality but insofar as it is 
caused by the end it is final causality” (DM 23.4.8). Yet, the conclusion, that final causation is 
therefore dependent on efficient, or that it is not real and proper causation, is hasty. For one 
thing, the locution, ‘metaphorical motion,’ is standard in discussions of the final cause, taken 
from Aristotle’s gloss on the role of the end of health in the doctor’s healing action in De 
generatione et corruptione. And, as Penner (2015, 135-6) observes, Suárez clearly affirms it as a 




real, but because it does not happen through effective influx nor through physical motion 
(23.1.14). For another, while it is true that final causation requires the action of efficient causes, 
it is equally the case, for Suárez, that efficient causes would not act except for the sake of ends. 
The actualization of the will depends on the attraction of the end just as much as the causality of 
the end depends on the actualization of the will. In good Aristotelian fashion, Suárez treats 
efficient and final causes as co-causes, and indeed, the latter as the “cause of causes” (27.1.8).13  
 Turning now to the formal cause: Suárez’s comparisons of efficient cause with the 
intrinsic causes are likewise not unequivocal pronouncements of the priority of the former. 
Again, the contexts for his remarks—that form and matter “are less perfect according to their 
own genera,” and that “the name ‘cause’ is said in the first place of efficient causes”—are 
important (DM 27.1.2; 27.1.10). In the first case, by declaring form and matter less perfect 
“according to their own genera,” Suárez notes that they are by their nature incomplete beings. 
That is, form and matter, “from the meaning of their concepts and by their entire extensions,” are 
such that they seek unity with each other for their reality (27.1.2). In this respect form and matter 
are contrasted with the supreme efficient cause and the supreme end, namely God, who surpasses 
any matter or form. That is, God is the efficient cause and the end of all things, but is not 
composed of forms inhering in matter, as finite substances are. The purpose of the second 
passage, meanwhile, is not to compare intrinsic and extrinsic causes but to explicate the 
analogical sense in which ‘cause’ is applied to all four. As Suárez later makes clear, none of the 
                                               
13 Des Chene, Schmaltz, Schmid, and others similarly take Suárez’s cognitivist view of final 
causation, that “in order for the end to cause, it is entirely necessary for it first to be cognized” 
(DM 23.7.2) to amount to a diminution in the status of the final cause vis-à-vis the efficient, and 
perhaps even rendering it otiose in the case of natural creatures. I refer the reader to Penner 
(2015, 136-43), who has responded in detail to this view, drawing on Suárez’s account of divine 




four causes is said univocally of God and creatures but only analogically. There is a large enough 
gap between the causalities of the first cause and of secondary causes that they cannot be called 
‘causes’ in the same way (27.1.9). Suárez’s language in the next paragraph confirms that the 
comparative claim is not dogmatic. He says only that, because matter and form are intrinsic 
principles of being in virtue of composition rather than external action, “they seem [videntur] to 
be called causes through the mentioned analogy” (27.1.10).  
 Furthermore, Disputations 15 and 16 amply demonstrate that Suárez considers form to 
exercise proper causality that is not conceivable as a kind of efficient causality. In DM 15.6, he 
affirms the distinct character of formal causality as its union with matter. Union is a manner of 
ontological dependence of a hylomorphic compound on a prior principle. Causality as union of 
form with matter fits Suárez’s general definition. First, there is proper separation between the 
elements of the causal relation: the causal principle, its causality, and the effect. The principle is 
the form, which has its own being apart from the matter with which it unites. The union of the 
two principles also has its separate being. It cannot be identical with the form, for, if “all these 
other things are posited and the union is taken away, it would be impossible for the form to 
exercise its causality.” For the same reason, it cannot be identical with matter. It thus counts as a 
third entity without which neither form nor matter would qualify as principles of the compound. 
Second, form properly gives being to the resulting compound insofar as it “communicates itself 
through itself to matter, that is, not by efficiently causing another similar perfection, but by 
communicating to matter its own perfection and entity” (15.6.7). Here he emphasizes the 
difference between union and action as distinct types of causality. In the former, an ontological 
principle gives its own being to the effect by constituting it; in the latter, the principle remains 




Suárez’s doctrine of cause, that different genera of causes do different kinds of work in 
accounting for one thing’s per se dependence on another.  
Suárez certainly departs from earlier tradition in giving greater attention to what Pasnau 
calls the ‘physical’ aspect of the substantial form, its role in regulating a material individual. 
Again, however, the dialectical context is crucial. Kara Richardson (2015) has effectively 
countered that Suárez’s recognition of a quasi-efficient causal role for substantial form does not 
displace the core sense of formal causality as union, or diminish its fundamental role in 
explaining the unity and individuation of substances. She argues that the impression of a choice 
between the metaphysical/formal and physical/efficient causal roles of substantial form is 
misleading. Suárez equally affirms both. His comparative emphasis on the latter (mainly in DM 
18.2-3, on the generation of material substances and the production of species-appropriate 
properties), is rather due to a recent circumstance in which the physical role has been contested 
by Thomas Cajetan.14  
Finally, Suárez directly rebuts the view that the efficient cause is primary. This opinion is 
associated in his time with non-Aristotelian sources, specifically Augustine and Seneca. He 
handles a statement in Augustine’s Eighty-Three Questions, that “every cause is efficient,” by 
pointing to its context in the discussion of divine causation. According to Suárez, Augustine’s 
intent in the passage is to urge against inquiring into the causes of the divine will in its decision 
to create the world. Augustine’s emphasis on efficient causality in this case has to do with the 
                                               
14 Suárez rejects Cajetan’s opinion at Summa theologiae 1.54.3 and 1.77.6, that the relation 
between substantial form and accident is that of “natural resulting,” so that the latter emanate 
from the former without any mediating efficient causal action. See Shields (2011) for a clear 
account of the various explanatory roles of substantial forms in Suárez, such as to account for 
property subordination, systemic equilibrium, and above all the special compositional unity that 




problem, which Suárez also recognizes and deals with in DM 23.9, that God cannot be said to act 
for the sake of external goods. For Suárez, Augustine does not wish to deny, however, that 
efficient causes can be conjoined with other genera of causes (DM 12.3.5). Suárez is less delicate 
with Seneca’s view, that form, matter, and end play the same kind of role in causal explanation 
as place, time, and local motion, that is, as mere necessary conditions. Briefly, Suárez insists on a 
distinction, central to his definition of cause, between explanatory grounds in the essence of an 
agent and those extrinsic to its essence. Although every (natural) change necessarily involves 
temporal and spatial conditions, time (ubi) and place (locus) are unlike form, matter, and end 
inasmuch as they are not grounded in agential natures but follow merely as accidents of the 
effect. The measure of duration and the place where change occurs are simply necessary 
consequences of forms uniting with matter or of end-directed action. But, unlike the latter 
principles, they do not per se give being to the effect (12.3.7).  
More to the point, what these passages reveal is that, for Suárez, the priority of the 
efficient cause thesis is the product of the humanist retrieval of non-Aristotelian ancient sources, 
rather than an option generated from within the scholastic commentary tradition. In fact, this is 
not the only non-Aristotelian view in the sixteenth-century waters. Suárez also acknowledges 
and rejects another heterodox position, associated with Socrates in the Phaedo, that only the end 
is a true cause and all other factors mere necessary conditions for its realization (12.3.4). If the 
efficient cause did come to enjoy paradigmatic status in later scholasticism, it could only have 
been in spite of Suárez.  
 To be sure, textual reasons in favor of the priority thesis cannot be outright dismissed. 
Yet, evidence that Suárez adhered to more traditional positions on the four causes is no less 




Nor does he claim that efficient causality is more intelligible than final and formal causality. One 
general lesson from Suárez’s lengthy examination in DM 12-27 seems to be that the concepts 
‘cause’ and ‘causality’ remain murky until spelled out in one of four respects, as form, matter, 
end, and efficient. It is not the case that one of these better fits the general account of cause than 
the others. Instead, Aristotle’s four genera fill out the definition in distinct ways. The immediate 
scholastic reception of Suárez’s theory of causation provides further evidence against the view 
that he accorded priority to the efficient cause.  
 
4. The Reception of Suárez’s Doctrine of Cause  
This part of the paper is guided by the thought that the contemporary reception of a text, and 
especially how it is read by its primary intended audience, can furnish valuable clues for 
understanding its meaning. This is not to advocate a radical reception theory of textual meaning, 
so that we could understand the Metaphysical Disputations simply by its reception history. Nor 
is to become oblivious to the possibility of early misinterpretation under the influence, say, of its 
readers’ polemical entanglements. Nevertheless, within suitable constraints, attention to how 
Suárez was read by his scholastic contemporaries serves important, albeit partial and defeasible, 
evidence for his views.  
 The influence of the Iberian Jesuits on seventeenth-century thought has long been 
recognized. Suárez, Fonseca, Toledo, and the Coimbra Commentators not only had a profound 
impact on Catholic philosophy but also injected fresh energy in Lutheran and Calvinist 
contexts.15 Leading texts from this period embrace Fonseca’s and Suárez’s innovative method of 
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commentary on Aristotelian metaphysics, of organizing it topically rather than following the 
order of Aristotle’s books. Their construction of metaphysics as a distinct science, separate from 
theology and which it should serve as an instrument, was a crucial reason behind their cross-
confessional appeal. Suárez’s prefatory remark, that “he is doing philosophy in such a way as to 
always keep in mind that our philosophy should be Christian and a servant to divine theology” is 
echoed, for instance, in the Lutheran Christoph Scheibler’s “Proemium” to his widely reprinted 
Metaphysica (1617), a work that earned him the title of ‘the Protestant Suárez.’ Jesuit 
discussions of causation too leave a clear imprint. This section focuses on representative Catholic 
and Protestant authors in the first half of the century.  
Among the most successful disseminators of Jesuit philosophy was the French Cistercian 
monk and Sorbonne professor, Eustache de Saint-Paul (1575-1640). Eustache’s Summa 
philosophiae quadripartita (1609) is an instance of the increasingly popular genre of the cursus, 
a compendium of philosophical theses with brief explications but without the rigorous 
examination of objections and replies characteristic of the commentaries of Suárez or Fonseca. 
Texts such as Eustache’s are primarily teaching aids and, for that reason, especially valuable 
sources for judging the standard reception of the leading authorities.16  
                                               
Suárez and the authors discussed in this section, together with brief biographies, see Lohr’s 
(1988) bibliography of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century editions of Aristotelian commentaries.  
16 Authors in this section are cited as follows: 
Eustache, Summa philosophiae, by part, tractatus, disputation, and question. 
Abra de Raconis, Tertia pars philosophiae seu Physica, by page. 
Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus, by book, disputation, section, and page. 
Timpler, Metaphysicae systema methodicum, by book, chapter, question, and page. 
Martini, Exercitationum metaphysicarum, by volume, exercise, theorem, and page. 
Alsted, Metaphysica, by book and chapter. 
Scharff, Metaphysica exemplaris, by book and chapter.  




In the physics part of his summa, Eustache acknowledges three ways in which ‘cause’ is 
used: wide (lata), narrow (stricta), and proper (propria). In the wide sense, it is synonymous 
with ‘principle,’ as what is prior to another in any sense whatsoever. This usage confuses 
principles of being and knowing, treating, for instance, the premises of a syllogism as causes of 
its conclusion in just the same way as fire is the cause of heat in water. In the narrow sense, 
cause denotes the efficient cause alone. Between the two is his preferred meaning, common to 
Suárez and the Coimbrans, as “that on which something else per se depends” (Id a quo aliquid 
per se pendet). He glosses ‘pendere’ or ‘dependere ab aliquo’ as dependence with respect to 
essence of something posterior and numerically distinct from its cause, in order to exclude 
relations among the Persons of the Trinity from counting as causal. Following Suárez, Eustache 
takes the ‘per se’ qualification to exclude per accidens factors and mere necessary conditions. To 
gloss this special mode of ontological dependence, he adopts Suárez’s terminology, that causality 
is influx of being from the cause into the effect (1.2.1.1). Like Suárez, he treats the two 
formulations of the definition as equivalent. ‘Influere’ glosses ‘pendere,’ emphasizing the 
admittedly mysterious communication of esse.  
 Eustache flatly rejects identifying cause with efficient cause. But does he think that the 
efficient cause best expresses the generic meaning of cause? In the next question, he declares all 
four Aristotelian causes to equally satisfy the definition (1.2.1.2). In their separate treatments, 
however, form and matter appear to have an ambiguous status. While granting that form has a 
certain ratio causandi, Eustache notes that it can also be called ‘principle,’ ‘element,’ and 
‘nature,’ in addition to ‘cause.’ It could be called ‘principle’ with respect to generation, ‘element’ 
insofar as it composes a natural substance, and ‘nature’ insofar as it is an innate principle of 




essentially distinct from its constituents and depends existentially on their union. That is, form 
qualifies as a cause on account of its constitutive role (1.2.2.1-2).  
 No tentativeness is present in his treatment of the two external causes. The account of the 
final cause opens with Aristotle’s definition of the end as “that for the sake of which something 
exists.” Eustache finds this definition sufficient for treating end as a “true and proper” cause, for 
no efficient cause would otherwise act. The effect of the final cause is the efficient causality of 
the agent (1.2.2.6). Eustache is clear about the ontological status of the final cause: in moving the 
agent to act, the end is what is intended as the determinate aim of an efficient causal power. The 
end thus causes with respect to “true and real being” (secundum esse verum et reale), not merely 
objective and intelligible being, even though, for Eustache as for Suárez, the latter is a necessary 
condition for final causation. The structure of all actions requires the per se dependence of the 
efficient cause on the end, and in virtue of it the end is called the “cause of [the other] causes” 
(1.2.2.7-8). Eustache’s summary presentation of the external causes does not accord any priority 
to the efficient but rather affirms their correlative character.  
 This account is confirmed in another popular cursus, Abra de Raconis’s (1580-1646) 
Summa totius philosophiae (1617). In the question on cause, after cataloguing several candidate 
definitions, Raconis focuses on the two accepted by Suárez. While expressing his preference for 
the second, “causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud,” he notes that it does not differ 
from the Coimbran definition. His reasons for preferring the former are Suárez’s, that it clearly 
places cause in the genus of principle, that the phrase ‘per se influens’ distinguishes the 
dependence of the effect on the cause from its dependence on per accidens factors, and that the 
phrase ‘esse in aliud’ specifies cause as a principle of being (1633, 133-4). The remainder of his 




suggestion that influx most properly denotes efficient causal action. Comparing the two external 
causes, he echoes Suárez in maintaining that, with respect to their formal characters, efficient 
and final causes excel each other in different respects. While the efficient cause is proximately 
responsible for producing an effect, the causality of the final cause surpasses that of the efficient, 
inasmuch as the latter would not act except on its account (1633, 143-4).  
 We find in the physics part of the Jesuit Rodrigo de Arriaga’s (1592-1667) Cursus 
philosophicus (1632) an emendation of both the Coimbran and Suárezian definitions. Arriaga is 
dissatisfied with the former for not excluding clearly enough non-causal dependence relations: 
“An effect per se depends on other conditions as well, e.g. on proximity and approximation to 
the cause, and other such conditions that are not causes.” The Coimbran definition, in other 
words, is too broad. The rest of Arriaga’s discussion of the definitional question is devoted to 
refining Suárez’s version. He begins with some unnamed objectors to Suárez’s formulation of 
‘causa’ as “principium per se influens esse in aliud,” who charge that it contradicts the right 
understanding of the Trinity. The objection is that it entails that God the Father is an intrinsic 
cause of the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in Christ, and thus is distinct in 
essence from Christ. But, “The Word cannot be said to be something absolutely other than 
Christ, because it includes Christ in itself, but [it can be said to be] other with respect to 
humanity, which it does not compose.” The details of the objection are less important for our 
purposes than Arriaga’s diagnosis of the underlying confusion. As he sees it, Suárez’s 
formulation would entail that the Father produces Christ as a distinct nature only if, a) 
‘principium’ included God in its extension, b) ‘influens esse’ meant ‘producing being,’ and c) ‘in 
aliud’ were understood in an unrestricted sense to include all beings, created and uncreated 




per se inflows by producing essence” (est illa quae per se influit producendo essentiam) (2.7.1, 
322). To deal with the aforementioned objections, he proposes to eschew the use of the word 
‘cause’ in divinis. He sharply distinguishes the case of creatures, in whom essence is produced, 
from the unproduced divine nature, restricting ‘causa’ to the former but allowing ‘principium’ to 
extend over both. Put differently, Arriaga restricts the definition of cause to creaturely causes and 
to the uncreated cause of creatures. Only produced beings can be properly said to have causes.  
 One might suspect that, by making explicit in the definition the notion of production, 
which typically suggests drawing out by an external operation, Arriaga prioritizes the efficient 
cause. Certain features of his subsequent account hint at such a position. For instance, he treats 
form, matter, and end all in one disputation, but devotes a separate, and the longest, discussion to 
the efficient cause. Yet, the impression is misleading. He defends his definition of the formal 
cause, as that which “through union bestows upon a subject its denomination,” as satisfying his 
revised general definition of cause (2.8.4, 350). He also resists the implication that final 
causation is restricted to the productive actions of rational agents, suggested in his acceptance of 
a cognitive condition. Drawing on Aquinas and Suárez, he argues that, although final causation 
is clearest in rational agents, it is nonetheless also real in non-human animals in virtue of God’s 
concurrence in their efficient causal actions (2.8.6, 355-7). As for his decision to treat efficient 
cause separately, Arriaga explains that it is not because efficient causes are ontologically prior. 
Rather, it is “inasmuch as it [the efficient cause] is the more principal and to which knowledge of 
the other causes is ordered” (2.9.1, 361). That is, efficient causation is prior only in the order of 
inquiry. It is how the nature of an agent qua cause is outwardly expressed, and consequently how 
its inner nature becomes accessible. Inquiry into the natural ends of an agent’s actions, into the 




begins with observation of its efficient causal action. But Arriaga does not take this sense of 
priority to entail that the efficient cause is uniquely deserving of the title of ‘cause,’ nor does he 
think the label applies in an attenuated sense to the other causes.  
 As noted earlier, Jesuit accounts of causation reached beyond the Catholic milieu. Soon 
after its first publication in Germany (Mainz, 1600), references to Suárez’s Disputations begin to 
appear alongside Fonseca, Pereira, and the Coimbrans in textbooks of both Calvinist and 
Lutheran professors. Among the first is the Reformed professor Clemens Timpler’s (1563-1624) 
Metaphysicae systema methodicum (1604). Timpler’s treatment of the question, “Quid sit causa 
in genere,” expresses wariness toward the project of defining cause in general. He is dissatisfied 
with a host of candidate definitions from Boethius to Suárez—that which satisfies inquiry; that 
from which another thing follows; that on which something per se depends; that on which 
something is contingent; that which bestows being on another; that by whose force something 
exists; a principle per se flowing being into another—for being either too broad or too narrow. 
Nevertheless, he finds agreement among philosophers on the following matters: a) cause is not 
an absolute but a respective being; b) a causal relation exists in virtue of causality, which 
grounds a connection between the cause, or the subject of the relation, and the effect, or the term 
of the relation; and c) that in the definition the genus is to be taken from “the order of the entity 
of the relata”—hence, it is to be a principle—and the specific difference from the order of their 
correlation—that the cause contains the ground of the effect. Taken together, these conditions 
yield a consensus definition, which turns out to be a looser version of the Coimbra formulation: 
cause is “a principle whence the effect depends” (principium unde causatum dependet) (3.2.3). 
For Timpler, Suárez’s gloss on ‘pendere’ as ‘influens esse’ does not add anything to the 




dependence, but does not betray a preference for any specific manner such dependence must 
take, whether through action, composition, or a natural tending-toward.  
 More sanguine about the project of defining cause is the Lutheran Jakob Martini (1570-
1649), professor at Wittenberg. In his Exercitationum metaphysicarum (1608), Martini offers a 
reformulation of Suárez’s definition of cause: “a principle that per se conveys influx to the being 
of the effect” (principium quod per se importat influxum ad esse causati) (1.4.1, 139). Like other 
authors, he notes wider and stricter meanings of cause, from being synonymous with principle to 
being restricted to the efficient. After considering a variety of positions, he defends the four-
cause model, and elaborates his definition by turning to Suárez. On the one hand, cause should 
be narrower than principle, by expressing ontological dependence and excluding privations and 
mere necessary conditions. On the other, causality should be broad enough not to denote strictly 
the action of the efficient cause. Rather, it should be equivalent to Suárez’s phrase “dandi vel 
communicandi.” Martini glosses ‘importat influxum,’ by quoting Suárez’s formulation of 
causality as “nothing other than that influx or concourse by which each cause in its genus flows 
being into the effect” (1.4.1, 143-4; DM 12.2.13). Martini’s definition is picked up by other 
Protestant authors, who interpret it as equally capturing the four Aristotelian causes while 
excluding non-causal necessary conditions. In his Metaphysica (1613) the Herborn Reformed 
professor Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638) affirms that ‘importat influxum’ extends over the 
causalities of matter and form as composition through union, of the efficient cause as action, and 
of the end as enticing the agent to act (1.27). The Wittenberg Lutheran Johannes Scharff’s (1595-
1660) popular handbook, Metaphysica exemplaris (1623), closely follows Martini’s 
reformulation of Suárez in its summary description of causation, affirming the view that agents 




A more detailed treatment occurs in the Metaphysica (1617) of Christoph Scheibler 
(1589-1653), Lutheran professor at Giessen. Scheibler’s commentary was widely used in 
Protestant universities, including at Oxford and Cambridge, through the mid-seventeenth 
century. In the question on cause, Scheibler identifies two desiderata for a definition. First, it 
should mention dependence that restricts the genus ‘principle’ to an ontological respect. 
Scheibler’s second desideratum, meanwhile, calls for sufficient latitude within the genus to 
accommodate different sorts of causalities: “in definitions of cause determinate manners of 
causing ought not to be assumed.” In particular, the general definition should not assume that 
action is the only kind of causality. Notably, for our purposes, he highlights Suárez’s definition 
as among those which clearly satisfy the second criterion. With these observations and 
qualifications, he offers his own definition which explicitly treats influx as a mode of 
dependence: “cause is a principle whence (or on whose influx) something depends” (causa est 
principium, unde (vel ex cuius influxu) pendet aliud)” (1.22.2.2).  
 The very first question Scheibler considers under the next heading, “On the divisions of 
the causes,” shows the centrality of the second desideratum in his mind. He begins his defense of 
Aristotle’s four-cause model by responding to the view that the efficient cause should uniquely 
count as cause. Like Suárez, he associates this position with Seneca, who contends that 
Aristotle’s notion of cause either embraces too much or too little.17 Too much, if what is sought 
is the proximate ground of any effect, for only the efficient cause fills that role; too little, if by 
‘cause’ is meant any requisite of an effect, in which case not only matter, form, and end, but also 
time, place, and motion should be included. Scheibler’s response echoes Suárez’s. He counters 
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that the reason why matter, form, and end are reckoned among the causes is that they constitute 
the agent in a way that makes it the ontological ground of the effect. Time, place, and motion, by 
contrast, are akin to privations and accidental correlates of actualized causality, that is, as 
necessary consequences of a causal situation but not sources of the being of the effect. For 
Scheibler, Seneca’s argument is an ignoratio elenchi that merely appeals to a general respect in 
which all Aristotelian causes resemble sine qua non conditions, namely as ingredients of causal 
situations, but does not give specific reasons either to exclude matter, form, and end from the 
Suárezian definition of cause or to include time, place, and motion under it (1.22.3.1.1).  
 Like Arriaga, Scheibler grants priority in the order of inquiry to the efficient cause. The 
efficient cause is “rightly placed” before the other causes insofar as the contributions of the other 
causes cannot be known except by means of an agent’s action. Inquiry into the proper ends of an 
agent or of the substantial form that integrates those ends commences by inspecting its behaviors 
(1.22.4.1). Yet, this weak sense of priority does not require overturning standard doctrines, that 
the end is primary in virtue of being the reason why an agent acts, or that the two external causes 
express natures that result from substantial forms inhering in matter, doctrines to which Scheibler 
holds fast. He affirms unequivocally that the end exercises “true influx” in the efficient cause by 
being the cause of its action (1.22.25.1) and, indeed, not just in rational agents but also in non-
rational nature (1.22.25.2). He also affirms that form exercises “true and real influx” in virtue of 
being a distinct principle that produces the compound through union with matter (1.22.21.1). 
 Examples of scholastic manuals in the first half of the seventeenth century espousing 
views of cause and causality along these lines can be multiplied. The following themes are worth 
highlighting. First, in scholastic discussions of cause in this period, Suárez and the Coimbra 




their definitions as a point of departure. To my knowledge, none of them interprets either 
definition to entail either ontological or conceptual priority of the efficient cause. Nor does 
anyone conclude that efficient causal action is paradigmatic causality, or that influx amounts to 
the transfer of qualities from agent to patient. At best, we find some authors recognizing the 
priority of efficient causation in experience, insofar as causal inquiry begins with the observation 
of one thing acting on another. Consequently, it is difficult to maintain that Jesuit accounts of 
cause anticipate later, post-Cartesian positions. If Suárez did anticipate the Cartesians’ insistence 
on the sufficiency of efficient causes, or if he held what Leibniz called the system of physical 
influx, that seems to have been entirely lost on his primary audience.  
 Furthermore, the thesis that the efficient cause is the only kind of cause is certainly in the 
air, as evident from the fact that several authors acknowledge and address it. But that thesis is 
due to the revival of ancient Stoicism, not to any internal shift within the later Aristotelian 
tradition. The expanded intellectual context of this period means that scholastic authors have to 
contend with a wider range of opposed doctrines. There is no indication, though, that any of 
them makes the least concession to the Stoic opinion. Moreover, Seneca’s is not the only 
alternative that has been made available and which finds its way in Aristotelian commentaries. 
Several authors also consider and reject the Socratic position, associated with the Phaedo, that 
the final cause alone deserves the title of cause, and typically do so alongside their criticism of 
the Stoic view. Under pressure to respond to new currents, a consistent theme among early 
modern scholastics is that wider and narrower meanings of cause are now available. But the 
correct view, from their Aristotelian standpoint, remains the middle one that recognizes four 




 Yet, the Aristotelian model undeniably breaks down in the second half of the seventeenth 
century, including in the scholastic context. Efficient causes assume primacy in certain authors 
seeking to renovate Aristotelian metaphysics in Descartes’s wake. Among these is Johann 
Clauberg, who attempts to graft the scholastic theory of cause onto a Cartesian doctrine of 
substance. What Clauberg’s case brings out is that the demise of Aristotelian causation has more 
to do with its unsuitability for a new theory of substance rather than with its own internal 
tensions.   
 
5. Johann Clauberg: Scholastic Causes, Cartesian Substances 
Descartes envisioned his Principles of Philosophy as an alternative to the Aristotelian 
curriculum. Although it rarely supplanted the scholastic manuals, Cartesianism made steady 
inroads in some academies in the mid-seventeenth century. One surprising milieu in which it was 
favorably received was the German Reformed, in large part due to the activities of Johann 
Clauberg (1622-65). After studying in Groningen and Leiden amid controversy surrounding the 
teaching of Descartes, Clauberg moved back to the Rhineland in 1651, first to Herborn and then 
to the newly founded university in Duisburg (est. 1654). There he set about promoting 
Cartesianism in works including Defensio cartesiana (1652), Initiatio philosophi sive dubitatio 
cartesiana (1655), and Paraphrasis in meditationes cartesii (1658). These would introduce 
subsequent generations of German academics to Descartes. In the last years of his life, Clauberg 
wrote systematic treatises on metaphysics and natural philosophy, scholastic in form but with 
important innovations in content. These include the third version of his ontology, Metaphysica 




his ambitious synthesis is instructive for understanding the transformation of the notion of 
cause.18  
 Clauberg develops his ontology in three editions: Elementa philosophiae (1647), 
Ontosophia nova (1660), and finally Metaphysica de ente (1664).19 In certain respects, these 
texts display a progressive shift toward Descartes.20 Crucially, by 1664 Clauberg has embraced 
Descartes’s substance-mode ontology and rejected hylomorphism. His treatment of causation 
remains outwardly continuous with the scholastic framework, but instabilities lurk beneath the 
surface. In what follows, I first examine Clauberg’s account of cause, and then show how his 
divergences from the Suárezian model are forced by his new metaphysics of substance.  
In the last version of his ontology (the one printed in his Opera omnia), Clauberg defines 
cause as, “a principle that gives being to another thing different from itself” (principium, quod 
alteri rei essentiam largitur a sua diversam) (ME 13.225). Cause is a principle that is responsible 
for the production or origin (Productionis seu Originis) of being (13.218). Like Suárez, Clauberg 
makes explicit that ‘cause’ is “contained under principle, as a species under a genus.” In 
                                               
18 Clauberg is a key figure in the so-called ‘cartesianische Scholastik’ (to use Bohatec’s (1912) 
label) movement. His teacher Johannes de Raey’s Clavis philosophiae naturalis (1654) is an 
important influence on Clauberg in this regard, as is his colleague Christoph Wittich’s effort to 
reconcile Descartes with Calvinist theology. Clauberg continued to shape German 
understandings of Descartes into the eighteenth century, as is evident from the extensive 
references to Clauberg as a representative of Cartesianism in Wolff’s Ontologia (1730). For the 
Duisburg background and Clauberg’s motivations in reconciling Descartes with Aristotelianism, 
see Hamid (2020). 
19 I cite Clauberg’s texts as follows: [ME]: Metaphysica de ente, by chapter and paragraph; 
[Elem.]: Elementa philosophiae, by page; [DP]: Disputationes physicae, by chapter and 
paragraph. 
20 On the question of the ‘scholastic’ and ‘Cartesian’ dimensions of Clauberg’s ontology, and 
their development over the course of his career, see Carraud (1999) and Savini (2011, 23-70). 
Rather than dwell on the question of whether Clauberg belonged more to one or the other camp, I 
endorse Savini’s recommendation to approach him as an original author in his own right, who 




particular, it involves dependence and priority with respect to being, and excludes logical and 
mathematical dependence relations as well as relations of temporal order or of knowledge. “A 
point,” as Clauberg writes, “is a principle of a line, not a cause” (13.220-1).21 As a principle of 
being, cause may be said either secundum esse, as the Sun is the principle of illumination in 
another thing, and as God is the principle of the origin and continued existence of things; or it 
may be said secundum fieri, as an architect is the cause of the coming into existence of a house 
but not of its enduring. In either case, cause is that which grounds some reality in another thing 
by producing it, or giving it being, in virtue of its own essence (13.223). 
 Like others before him, Clauberg thinks all causality involves the bringing forth of a new 
reality. More sharply than his predecessors, however, he distinguishes production in which the 
causal agent remains external to effect, as when fire produces heat in water, from production that 
involves the principle becoming part of a new compound. For him, only the former is properly 
causal. Thus, Clauberg excludes form and matter from counting as causes, for the reason that 
these are better considered “as parts of the thing from which its essence is composed than as 
causes of the thing” (ut partes rei, ex quibus essentia ejus componitur, quam ut causas rei) (ME 
13.225). Indeed, there is no further treatment of form and matter under cause. A cause is strictly 
a principle of acting (principium agendi), whether as the principal agent of an action or as its 
instrument. With respect to his definition of cause, union fits the condition of ‘giving being,’ but 
                                               
21 Clauberg does not equate ‘cause’ with ‘principle,’ as Platt (2020, 162-5) argues. Platt’s 
reading is motivated by a concern to defend an interactionist account of Clauberg’s response to 
the mind-body problem. According to him, Clauberg resolves that problem by treating mere 
dependence as a type of efficient causal relation, which would permit him to conceive non-
productive dependence relations between heterogeneous substance as causal. Mind and body 
could then be said to mutually interact in virtue of the regular covariations between their states. 
Clauberg’s discussion of ‘principium’ and ‘causa’ in the texts cited above are clear in restricting 




fails that of ‘to another thing different from itself.’ He acknowledges that the notion of cause is 
used with wider latitude. Causal locutions are employed to speak of ends moving the will, or 
form and matter making up a thing (13.226). Yet, strictly speaking, the efficient cause alone 
produces its effect by an action belonging to a suppositum, and more precisely, through a force 
of acting grounded in the essence of a substance. For Clauberg, action is paradigmatic causality, 
and “to act is applicable only to the efficient cause” (13.227). Unlike his predecessors, he is not 
interested in distinguishing efficient causality from other types of genuine causality. Rather, his 
point is that, whereas causal language is used loosely in other cases, the power of acting alone is 
what makes substances be causes. Since action is the causality of the efficient cause, this entails 
that the efficient cause alone is a true cause. Clauberg’s narrowing of causality to action is 
reflected in the chapter heading: “Principium. Causa. Actio.” 
 To express causal dependence through action, however, Clauberg rejects the Suárezian 
language of influx in favor of ‘to give’ and ‘to receive’ (largire, accipere). He confesses being 
unable to understand what “those who define action as the fluxus of effect from cause” conceive 
as passing from agent to patient (ME 13.231). His criticism of Suárez’s terminology reveals that 
he associates with it the sort of meaning that La Forge and Leibniz attach to it, as involving a 
transfer of qualities. Whatever else ‘giving being’ expresses for him, we may infer that it is 
supposed to exclude a conception of causality as the migration of properties, which we may 
further surmise has become associated by the 1660s with ‘influxus.’ Clauberg’s criticism also 
betrays a shift in his own views. In the 1647 version of his ontology, he had defined efficient 
causality using just that locution, as “fluxus effectus a causa” (Elem., 68). The rejection of 
Suárez’s language and what he takes it to connote, though, is only a consequence of a deeper 




 In all versions of his ontology, Clauberg commences with a threefold signification of 
‘being.’ In the widest sense, ‘ens’ refers to the merely thinkable, as “whatever can be thought or 
said,” which includes thought about non-being (nihil). In the second, as ‘aliquid,’ ens picks out 
what is positively knowable in things in virtue of their possible existence outside thought. 
‘Aliquid’ is opposed to ‘nihil’ and denotes those beings to which existence is not repugnant 
(Elem., 37-42; ME 2-3.6-41).22 In earlier and later versions, Clauberg retains these meanings of 
‘ens’ and ‘aliquid.’ What shifts is his account of the third and strictest sense of being, ‘ens reale.’ 
In Elementa, Clauberg writes that, “real being is something to which real attributes belong, or, 
that real being obtains not only outside the intellect but also in itself” (Elem., 43). That is, ens 
reale refers not only to the eternal objects of thought but also to beings that instantiate those 
attributes. He then proceeds to elaborate the transcendental attributes of beings, beginning with 
essence and existence, followed by unity, truth, goodness, and a host of disjunctive attributes, 
including principium/principiatum and causa/causatum. Only after treating being and its general 
properties does Clauberg turn to the things that have those properties in common, namely the 
species of substance (finite and infinite) and the categories of accident. In 1647, Clauberg’s 
ontology follows Suárez’s division of metaphysics, and more specifically, the order of topics laid 
out in textbooks of Reformed scholastics such as Timpler.  
 By contrast, in 1664 Clauberg departs both in the order and the content of his ontology in 
crucial respects. For one thing, he inserts the topic of substance into the general doctrine of ens 
reale. More consequentially, his treatment of real being embraces the Cartesian substance-mode 
                                               
22 For Clauberg’s threefold notion of ‘ens,’ see Carraud (1999, 19-20), and Bardout (1999, 136-
7), The wide conception of being, and thus of the subject matter of metaphysics, is shared by 
Clauberg’s Reformed predecessors, beginning with Timpler. Suárez’s role in the development of 




ontology while rejecting the Aristotelian substance-accident framework. Ens reale picks out 
substance, or “that which exists in such a way that it does not need a subject in which to exist,” a 
meaning he takes to be common to Aristotle and Descartes (ME 4.44). He rejects, however, the 
opposed notion of accident, or “that which exists in another, as in a subject.” Specifically, he 
rejects accidents insofar as they are conceived as forms that are really distinct from substances in 
which they inhere. Instead, Clauberg prefers Descartes’s division of beings into substances and 
modes. He divides modes into “modes of things” (modi rerum), or the variable, non-essential 
properties of a substance; and, borrowing a phrase from Descartes, “modes of thinking” (modi 
cogitandi), or the “essential and inseparable” attributes that permanently describe a substance 
(4.44; cf. Principles 1.62, AT 8A.30, CSM 1.214). Both modes and attributes depend on 
substances, and neither is really distinct or separable from substance. Modi rerum are modally 
distinct from the substances to which they belong, as concrete properties that have no reality 
other than as states of a substance (4.46). The distinction between a substance and its attributes, 
meanwhile, is conceptual. Attributes are aspects under which a substance is cognized, rather than 
general properties of substances of which modes would be instances. In Clauberg’s list, the 
common attributes of substance include ones that Descartes recognizes in the Principles—such 
as duration, order, and number—as well as the absolute and respective transcendentalia of the 
Scotistic tradition—one, true, good, principle, cause, whole/part, sign/signified, and so on.  
 Clauberg now further follows Descartes in maintaining that every substance has one 
principal attribute through which its modes are most distinctly cognized (ME 4.47). To identify 
these, he considers those features of substances which are “maximally opposed and contrary,” 




will in minds, for the reason that modes conceivable through one cannot be conceived through 
the other (4.48). Consequently, real being  
is divided first of all in corporeal or material, that is, extended in length, breadth, and 
depth, of which sort are air, fire, water, etc […] and intellectual, that is, to which belong 
thinking or intellecting and willing, as God, angels, and rational souls.23 (4.49)  
For Clauberg, prior to the enumeration of the transcendental attributes of being is its division into 
two species of substance. The character of ens reale as either body or mind now constrains the 
sense of its further predicates. 
Principal attributes define substances as endowed with a certain essence, or “that whole 
through which a thing both is, and is what it is” (totum illud, per quod res & est, & est id quod 
est) (ME 5.60). In virtue of its essence, a body is both suited to existence as such and to exist as a 
particular kind of thing, namely a corporeal rather than mental substance. Clauberg retains 
standard theses concerning essence: that it does not permit of greater or lesser, that it is 
indivisible and immutable, and that it belongs to a substance necessarily (5.65-70). His crucial 
break from his scholastic predecessors consists in the denial that corporeal and mental essences 
constitute substances as parts of hylomorphic compounds. The relation of Cartesian essences to 
substances is radically unlike that of substantial forms to hylomorphic individuals. Clauberg is 
happy to admit form as naming that set of features by which one thing is distinguished from 
another and, to that extent, to regard the essence of a substance “sub ratione formae.” What he 
rejects, however, is that form in this sense should be counted as a part from which a substance is 
composed (5.61-2). Following Descartes, Clauberg conceives substances as complete beings that 
                                               
23 “Hinc res primo dividuntur in Corporeas seu materiales, hoc est extensas in longum, latum & 
profundum, cujusmodi sunt aer, ignis, aqua, &c. & intellectuales, hoc est, cogitatione sive 




depend exclusively on God for their existence. Corporeal and mental essences express, 
respectively, the whole nature of a mind or a body, as real beings to which existence apart from 
all other finite substances is not repugnant. Mind and body, unlike scholastic form and matter, do 
not essentially stand in need of mutual union in order to exist. In this regard, Clauberg decisively 
breaks from reigning scholastic orthodoxy. Suárez, for one, defines form as, “a certain simple 
and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes with it the essence of a 
composite substance” (DM 15.5.1). As an incomplete being, form necessarily requires union 
with matter in order to exist. For Suárez, the soul, or the form of a living body, for instance, “is 
not a part in the sense of something whole in itself, but is essentially a part, and has an 
incomplete essence, which is by its own nature ordained to make another essence complete; 
hence it is always an incomplete substance” (33.1.11). The soul cannot naturally exist unless 
united with matter. It is certainly thinkable in abstraction from matter. But it is not thinkable as 
an existing thing apart from its union, and is hence not an ens reale capable of existing simply in 
virtue of its relation to God. For Clauberg, by contrast, to souls and bodies belong simple and 
complete essences, in virtue of which they are able to exist separately.  
 We can now appreciate the consequences of Clauberg’s rejection of hylomorphism in 
favor of the Cartesian theory of substance for his doctrine of cause. Briefly, the attempt to fit the 
scholastic causal model onto Descartes’s doctrine of substance results in its breakdown. For one 
thing, as already noted, Aristotelian matter and form drop out as causes altogether. Clauberg 
rehabilitates both notions in his Disputationes physicae (1664), but in senses that are equally 
foreign to both Descartes and Suárez. There, he redeploys a scholastic distinction between prime 
matter (materia prima) and secondary matter (materia secunda) to refer, respectively, to 




The former is the total quantity of extension making up the material universe, whereas the latter 
refers to individual bodies, understood as packets of extension individuated by their 
characteristic motions—geometrical features that determine the manner in which one volume is 
modified upon collision with another. What Claubergian matter is not, is potentiality seeking 
union with form. Rather, it is a complete substance created separately by God and governed by 
its own, divinely instituted laws.  
Claubergian form, meanwhile, has little to do with the notion of substantial form as an 
internal principle of the unity and composition of a substance, a doctrine to which Suárez and his 
generation are deeply committed. Clauberg vigorously rejects substantial forms as explanatorily 
idle (DP 12.4-38). Instead, he introduces a deflated notion of form as nothing more than the 
structural dispositions of a body to be modified in characteristic ways. Forms, in Clauberg’s 
physics, are passive structures of modes of extension, nominally individuated by characteristic 
motions resulting from external impact. His examples illustrate the vast gulf between these 
corporeal forms and the metaphysically weighty entities of earlier tradition. For Clauberg, by 
form can be meant nothing more than, for example, the shape, size, and bulk of a key that makes 
it suited to turn certain locks, or the same kinds of properties of a pen that make it suitable for 
writing. “Besides this, in what way substantial forms are needed or in what way, if they existed, 
they would contribute, cannot even be understood” (12.38). Clearly, such examples greatly 
underestimate the explanatory challenge of the facts that lead Suárez or Fonseca to adopt 
substantial forms. Suárez would appeal to facts about the subordination of properties, or the 
maintenance of systemic equilibrium in plants and animals, to motivate the doctrine. Clauberg 




properties and divine laws of motion. For him, in a Cartesian universe, the notion of form can 
only retain a very attenuated meaning, as a bare structure described in mathematical terms.24  
Finally, Clauberg unambiguously restricts ends to mental substance. “End properly 
belongs to intelligent things. Things lacking intelligence do not properly act for the sake of an 
end, but are moved here and there by God or another intelligent cause according to will, as an 
archer directs the arrow to a certain target” (ME 15.261). Clauberg follows earlier authors in 
endorsing a cognitive condition on final causation. But with his new theory of substance, that 
condition takes on wholly different significance. Applied to corporeal substance conceived as 
extension, a cognitivist view of ends straightforwardly entails that bodies are mere instruments of 
mental substances. Clauberg need not confront the question, consistently asked by his 
predecessors, of how non-rational appetites could produce goal-directed action. As passive 
extension, bodies do not possess end-directed efficient causal powers grounded in formal 
natures, which are realized with the assistance of God’s concurring cognition. Indeed, missing 
from Clauberg is any acknowledgement of the thesis, ‘omne agens agit propter finem,’ or a 
concern for saving final causation in natural agents that is present in Suárez, Scheibler, or 
Arriaga. In the material world, it is sufficient to discover the laws of motion God has decreed.  
In sum, Clauberg’s treatment of causation evinces a far-reaching revision of the 
Aristotelian framework and a rise to salience of the efficient cause as the central causal notion. 
What Clauberg’s case reveals, moreover, is that this development is not due so much to any 
internal tensions, real or apparent, in the Aristotelian four-cause model, as to his embrace of a 
radically anti-Aristotelian theory of substance. His innovations bring to the surface the 
                                               





inseparability of the scholastic causal model from substance hylomorphism. Once Clauberg has 
jumped the latter ship, the former inevitably disintegrates.  
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that, contrary to a recent narrative, Suárez does not pave the way for the modern 
privileging of efficient causation. The claim that, for Suárez, efficient cause is the paradigmatic 
cause rests on two contentions. First, that his definition of cause, as a principle “per se flowing 
being into” its effect, is modeled on the efficient cause; and second, that he accords diminished 
standing to the other Aristotelian species of cause in one respect or another. I have argued 
against both of these positions. Suárez’s definition amounts to ontological dependence of effect 
on cause in a broad sense, ranging over four distinct kinds of causal grounds. Suárez would 
specifically deny that his notion of influx signifies what La Forge, Leibniz and others since have 
associated with it, namely as involving the migration of properties from one substance to 
another. Further, building on Penner (2015) and Richardson (2015), I have argued that textual 
evidence in Suárez for the comparative priority of the efficient cause vis-à-vis the other three 
causes is at best ambivalent. Attention to Suárez’s scholastic readers in the first half of the 
seventeenth century provides additional evidence against the view that he or his fellow Jesuits 
privilege the efficient cause. Finally, I have used the case of Clauberg to argue that, within the 
scholastic tradition, the decisive blow to the Aristotelian causal framework comes, not from any 
fatal instabilities in its doctrine of cause, but only with the displacement of substance 
hylomorphism by a Cartesian theory of substance.25 
                                               
25 While I have focused on the consequences for causation arising from the rejection of 
hylomorphism, it must be borne in mind that other developments in natural philosophy are a 




 The decline of the scholastic theory of cause mirrors that of another favorite target of the 
novatores, the substantial form. The latter’s most fervent critics, from Descartes to Locke, never 
refuted the doctrine of substantial form on its own terms. As Pasnau (2004, 46) notes, the 
mechanists just “never took the theory seriously enough to mount a vigorous challenge,” 
preferring instead to build a rival view that could explain the data for which the scholastics had 
posited substantial forms. Much the same can be said for their dismissal of the Aristotelian 
causal framework. Descartes never directly criticizes the four-cause model, nor does he show 
any interest in scholastic debates around the general definition of cause. In his physics, at least, 
he simply has no need for notions of causality as constitution or as the attraction of ends. For 
their part, Suárez and his fellow Jesuits need not be moved by Descartes’s polemics against final 
causation any more than they should worry that he has advanced compelling arguments against 
substantial forms. Suárez himself formulates objections to both doctrines that are far more 
precise than anything the mechanists have to offer. In this circumstance of ships passing in the 
night, Clauberg’s valiant effort to reconcile Aristotelian causes with Cartesian substances is 
instructive inasmuch as it highlights key incompatibilities between the two frameworks. With 
respect to causation, he succeeds only in retaining the language of the scholastic tradition, but 




                                               
mathematical models of explanation in the sixteenth century, sufficiently orthogonal to the 
scholastic context, has much to do with the emergence of new understandings of causation. I 
thank an anonymous referee for this reminder.  
26 I would like to thank Devin Curry for detailed comments on an earlier draft, and two 
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